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INTRODUCTION
The Supremacy Clause's declaration that treaties "shall be the supreme Law
of the Land"' seems to sit uneasily within the structural design of the
Constitution. Martin Flaherty has persuasively argued that this provision was
designed to give treaties the same status as domestic law, thereby reassuring
treaty partners that the young United States took its international obligations
seriously.2 In so doing, however, the Supremacy Clause created two separate
paths to federal lawmaking-a two-house statutory and a one-house treaty
procedure- governed by very different sets of constitutional rules. When set
side by side, the treaty power appears kingly compared to the tightly
circumscribed legislative power. The House of Representatives -the most
democratic federal body and the only one directly elected at the time of the
founding-was cut out of the treaty ratifying process altogether. While the
framers crafted Article I to spell out carefully the range of permissible topics for
federal statutory legislation, no similar limits were placed on the treaty power,3
implying that there are no restrictions on it beyond those created by
international law.4 States, meanwhile, were given no treaty-making authority
at all.' Finally, through a quirk of drafting, the framers even created doubts
about whether treaties were relieved from constitutional constraints such as the
Bill of Rights.6 The power to make law through treaty, in other words, was not
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2.
2. See Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and
Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2095 (1999); see also David M.
Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception
of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075 (2000). Chief Justice Marshall also noted in the
seminal treaty law case Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), that the Supremacy
Clause was specifically intended to distinguish the United States from Great Britain, where
treaties needed to be implemented by Parliament before having legal effect: "In the United
States a different principle is established. Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of
the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded as equivalent to an act of the legislature . . . ." Id.
at 314.
3. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) ("No doubt the great body of private
relations usually fall with the control of the State, but a treaty may override its power.").
4. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 261 (1796) ("The subject of treaties... is to be
determined by the law of nations.").
S. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
6. Article VI declares laws "made in pursuance" of the Constitution and treaties
"made... under the Authority of the United States" to be the "supreme Law of the Land,"
introducing some doubt as to whether treaties must also be made "in Pursuance" of
constitutional dictates. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supreme Court finally put this
question to rest in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (plurality opinion), which held:
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only one of the most sweeping lawmaking tools placed in the hands of the
federal government, but also the one subject to the fewest structural and
procedural constraints.
A long line of critics, starting with Thomas Jefferson, have advocated sharp
limits on the use of the treaty power out of a belief that automatically
incorporating treaty law into domestic law via the Supremacy Clause is
inconsistent with the Constitution's general scheme for a federal government
of limited powers.7 To them the treaty power's breadth, even if fully intended
by the framers, seems to lie at cross purposes -or, more charitably, oblique
angles- to other constitutional values embedded in the structure of the federal
system. Because treaties are not approved by the House of Representatives, for
example, they have been attacked as an insufficiently democratic way to create
domestic law." Many others have accused the treaty power of undermining the
value of federalism, if treaties can directly make domestic law on matters
otherwise reserved to the states. 9  Treaties can also threaten some
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who created the
Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights-let
alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition-to construe Article
VI as permitting the United States to exercise power under an international
agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions.
7. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, Manual of Parliamentary Practice for the Use of the Senate of the
United States, in JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS 353, 420-21 (Wilbur Samuel
Howell ed., 1988) ("To what subjects this (treaty] power extends has not been defined in
detail by the Constitution; nor are we entirely agreed among ourselves.... It must have
meant to except out of these the rights reserved to the States; for surely the President and
Senate can not do by treaty what the whole Government is interdicted from doing in any
way.... And also to except those subjects of legislation in which it gave a participation to
the House of Representatives. This last exception is denied by some on the ground that it
would leave very little matter for the treaty power to work on. The less the better, say
others.").
8. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 400 (2oo0) ("Constitutional principles ... suggest that
domestic federal law with respect to human rights should be made through a lawmaking
process that involves the House of Representatives."); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the
Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REv.
1955, 1962 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism] ; John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking:
A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2240 (1999)
[hereinafter Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking] (noting that non-self-execution "better
promotes democratic government.., by requiring the consent of the most directly
democratic part of the government, the House of Representatives, before the nation can
implement treaty obligations at home").
9. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390
(1998) (arguing that Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), was incorrectly decided and
that the treaty power should be restrained by Article I and the Tenth Amendment); Gary
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understandings of national sovereignty, since they may subject quintessentially
"national" decisions to international influence, including the power to define
and interpret basic rights.'" And lastly, critics have argued that allowing treaty
law to be incorporated directly into domestic law threatens the separation of
powers between the judicial and political branches, by putting the judiciary's
inclination to stay out of foreign affairs in tension with its constitutional
imperative to declare "what the law is.""
These four critiques have formed the basis of an extensive literature on the
Supremacy Clause, with legal scholars vigorously debating whether all, some,
or none of these values form (or were intended to form) actual constitutional
constraints on the exercise of the treaty power. What is curious about this
debate, however, is that it has been almost entirely eclipsed by events on the
ground, where a wave of political opposition to incorporating treaties directly
into national law has come close to nullifying the Supremacy Clause without
amending the Constitution's text. This modern resistance to the treaty power
has taken several forms. First, in many cases treaties have been replaced by so-
called congressional-executive agreements, which are international agreements
initiated by the President and then endorsed by simple majorities of both
houses of Congress. 2 Second, in the last thirty years the Senate has developed
a regular practice of attaching reservations, declarations, and understandings
during its ratification of treaties - and human rights treaties in particular - in
order to limit their domestic legal effect.'" These reservations have been used to
Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 1; Nicholas
Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1867 (2005); Edward T.
Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 403 (2003).
10. See International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
9 6th Cong. 21, 54-55 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Hearings] (memorandum from the U.S. Dep't
of State) ("[T]he Covenants and U.S. statutes, while embodying almost identical rights, are
not identical in wording. The purpose of the non-self-executing declaration, therefore, is to
prevent the subjection of fundamental rights to differing and possibly confusing standards
of protection in our courts.").
ii. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 8, at 2248 (arguing that courts should
refuse to enforce treaties because they involve "difficult policy questions inherent in
determining how best to execute the nation's international obligations," which are better
suited to the political branches).
12. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, io8 HARv. L. REv. 799, 8ol-
04 (1995) (describing the development of and increase in the use of congressional-executive
agreements in place of treaties).
13. This practice has been criticized by legal scholars but faces no serious legal challenge. See
Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 63 (1990)
[hereinafter HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALSM]; Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United
States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L.
11 7:68o 20o8
ENFORCING THE TREATY RIGHTS OF ALIENS
define treaty-based rights as equivalent to already existing constitutional and
statutory rights, to block domestic enforcement of treaty rights by courts, and
to preserve the same federal-state allocation of implementation authority that
exists for statutory legislation.' 4 Third, the judiciary has shown an increasing
reluctance to allow treaties to be enforced in court as part of domestic law,
often declaring treaties to be non-self-executing- that is, unenforceable- even
when the Senate did not express a reservation against its enforcement."5
Internationalist legal scholars have tried, to little avail, to address this third
point of resistance by using text and history to shore up Supreme Court
precedents like Missouri v. Holland, 6 thereby hoping to encourage courts to
support a broad reading of the federal treaty power.' 7 Arguments addressed
solely to courts, however, ignore the most important limits on the exercise of
the treaty power today, which are the constraints being imposed by the political
branches as they attempt to accommodate certain constitutional values or
norms. 8 This act of political self-regulation may in turn be feeding back into
the lower courts' reluctance to enforce treaty rights as domestic law, even when
the treaty language appears enforceable on its face. 9 Modern practice, in other
REV. 515, 516-18 (1991); Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 1O MICH. J.
INT'L L. 406,425 (1989).
14. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 414-16, for a discussion of reservations to human
rights treaties suggested by President Carter in 1978, as well as the reservations ultimately
attached to four human rights treaties during the 198os and 199os at the suggestion of
Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton.
is. See infra Section I.D.
16. 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) ("No doubt the great body of private relations usually fall with the
control of the State, but a treaty may override its power.").
17. Most scholars have approached the question of the Supremacy Clause from the perspective
of the framers' intent. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 2; Golove, supra note 2, at 1102-49;
Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988); Carlos Manuel
Vizquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1101-14
(1992) [hereinafter Vzquez, Treaty-Based Rights]. Carlos Manuel Vizquez also put forth the
nationalist argument from the perspective of constitutional text and structure. Carlos
Manuel Vizquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999) [hereinafter Vizquez,
Laughing at Treaties].
iS. By focusing on these political or quasi-constitutional constraints imposed by political actors
other than the courts (or by the courts, responding to what I argue are political or quasi-
constitutional concerns), I owe a debt to other scholars who have developed the idea of the
importance of the "Constitution outside the court." See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Robert Post &
Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1027 (2004).
ig. See John Quigley, Toward More Effective Judicial Implementation of Treaty-Based Rights, 29
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 552, 554 (2006) (noting that the "approach by the courts in recent
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words, has forged a treaty power that bears little resemblance to the nationalist
vision that has been ascribed to the framers. Therefore, it is time for those who
support the nationalist vision to engage seriously with the concerns that
underlie the current anxiety over the treaty power.2" If the incorporation of
treaty law into domestic law is to be shaped by constitutional values like
democracy, sovereignty, federalism, and separation of powers-whether we
like it or not-we can see that these values are not implicated equally by all
treaties. In particular, the direct application of treaty rights extraterritorially
poses little threat to these values. Further, treaties that create legal protections
that attach uniquely to noncitizens, such as extradition rights, combatant
rights, rights of nonrefoulement, or consular notification rights, also implicate
few of these constitutional values while providing additional protections for a
discrete minority that is politically disadvantaged by virtue of its
disenfranchisement.
This Note proposes a way to accommodate these anxieties without
rendering the Supremacy Clause a dead letter. When the Senate or the federal
judiciary refuse to incorporate treaty law into domestic law out of a desire to
protect constitutional values like federalism, democracy, or sovereignty, they
are often administering a political medicine far stronger than the disease they
seek to cure. Part I of this Note explores the anxieties that underlie the current
popular resistance to the direct domestic application of treaty law, in order to
show that these are not so much firm limitations that derive from the
Constitution's text, but political constraints that are nonetheless very real and
have constitutional resonance. Part II shows how these anxieties would not be
implicated by the enforcement of treaty rights outside the territorial bounds of
the United States, such as allowing treaty rights to be claimed and enforced by
aliens who are subject to the power of the United States abroad. Part III looks
at the special issue of treaties that regulate the rights unique to noncitizens and
shows that constitutional concerns are misplaced here as well. Finally, Part IV
proposes a new framework that both the judiciary and Senate could use to
implement treaty law that would create a legal check on the President's exercise
decades" of finding treaties non-self-executing "contrasts with that of our nineteenth-
century courts"); Carlos Manuel Vfizquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 722-23 (1995) (noting the general modem trend that courts have tended
to confuse the doctrine of self-executing treaties, leading to an expansion of non-self-
execution).
2o. A few scholars have focused on the role of the political branches in shaping the modem use
of the treaty power, but from the perspective of championing the Senate's practice of
imposing these constraints. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8; Duncan B. Hollis,
Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REv.
1327 (2006).
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of his foreign affairs power while affirming fundamental constitutional values.
Treaty rights are by far the most important source of protection from
government abuse for those who are subject to government action outside the
nation's borders-who may not be able to claim statutory or constitutional
rights-and for aliens within the nation's borders, who are shut out of the
political process. Therefore, a piecemeal approach to implementing and
enforcing treaty rights, while not satisfying to all, could move the debate over
treaties away from certain high-stakes constitutional and political questions
while providing protection to those most vulnerable to state abuse.
I. ANXIETY AND THE ARRIVAL OF LIMITS ON THE TREATY POWER
Thomas Jefferson's critique of the treaty power has found voice throughout
American history, reaching its zenith during Senator John Bricker's lengthy
and personal campaign in the 1950s to restrict the treaty power through
constitutional amendment." This Part identifies the four recurring
"constitutional anxieties" that seem to have motivated this history of resistance
to using treaties as a method for creating law. It then traces how these concerns
have been ameliorated through the modern practices of the political branches. I
argue, contra to many scholars who have championed the Jeffersonian view,
that these anxieties are not rooted in actual, textual constitutional constraints. I
will show, however, that these claims can have constitutional resonance that
explains both their strength and endurance as critiques and why they have so
affected the practices of the political branches today.
At root, all of these critiques are preoccupied with the substantive and
procedural gap between lawmaking by statute and lawmaking by treaty. These
deviations, I will argue, are required by the text, structure, and design of the
Constitution. Nonetheless, the procedures that govern statutory lawmaking,
the most common and familiar form of federal lawmaking, tend to dominate
our collective legal imagination, shaping our expectations of how law is
legitimately made in the American system. To the extent that lawmaking
through the treaty power deviates from these norms, it is perceived as less
constitutionally legitimate, even though these deviations are themselves
constitutionally created. The political branches have responded to this
21. Bricker was primarily motivated by the fear that human rights treaties signed in the
aftermath of World War II might undercut the "right" of states to perpetuate racial
segregation. See NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A
HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 1-36 (1990); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights
Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 348-49 (1995) (describing
the Bricker amendment campaign).
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legitimacy gap by becoming increasingly cautious about employing the treaty
power in a way that transgresses the norms that govern statutory lawmaking.
These anxieties, therefore, cannot be said to reflect either purely "political" or
"constitutional" considerations. They are political in the sense that it goes
beyond mere respect for literal constitutional constraints, but they are
constitutional because it derives from beliefs about the legitimacy of
lawmaking within the Constitution's structure.
Some may object to the idea of according even this quasi-constitutional
status to the interpretations of the political branches. Because the Supreme
Court so infrequently weighs in on constitutional questions that implicate
foreign affairs and interbranch relations, however-the last major case
interpreting the Supremacy Clause is nearly a hundred years old22 -the
consistent practice of the political branches can be a better indicator of the
meaning of the Supremacy Clause than looking to pure text or judicial
interpretation. 3 Particularly in this realm, drawing a sharp line between the
"political" and the "constitutional" is difficult. This is not to say that I
necessarily agree with those scholars who have argued that we should set the
constitutional interpretations of the political branches on equal par with the
interpretations offered by the judicial branch.' Rather, I simply note that the
political branches follow a number of consistent political practices that have
sharply limited the use of the treaty power. These practices appear designed to
protect certain "constitutional values," even though such a use of the treaty
power would not run afoul of the letter of the Constitution. These political
practices, therefore, could be deemed a kind of quasi-constitutional law of the
Supremacy Clause.
A. The Democratic Deficit
The first, most obvious critique of the treaty power is that it lacks
democratic legitimacy. The treaty power, unlike the legislative power, is lodged
in only one house of Congress. The framers' decision to entrust the treaty
power to the President, with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senate, left the House of Representatives, the most democratic body in the
22. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
23. See generally HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67-72 (1990) (describing text, framework statutes,
and "quasi-constitutional custom" as the elements that help define the "National Security
Constitution").
24. See, e.g., KRAMFR, supra note 18 (arguing that the constitutional interpretations of the
political branches ought to be accorded greater weight than judicial interpretations).
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federal system -and the only one that was directly elected at the time of the
founding- completely out of the process. This design reflected the lingering
strength of the idea of state sovereignty, since the Senate represented primarily
the states and not the people.2" But because the treaty power would almost
inevitably be used to regulate matters that were also committed under Article I
to the whole of Congress, such as the power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and Indian tribes, lay duties, and define intellectual property rights,26
the framers virtually ensured that the House would clash repeatedly with the
Senate and President as it sought to guard its statutory power against perceived
depredations by the Senate and President.27 Underlying these attacks was an
argument that the treaty power was not an appropriately democratic way to
create federal law, when Congress possesses concurrent power to legislate
under Article I.
The House of Representatives' long-running assault on the treaty power
left behind a complex set of interhouse and interbranch rules that limit some
uses of the treaty power when Congress possesses concurrent legislative power,
establishing a realm of quasi-constitutional practice. The Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law states that the Constitution requires Congress to enact
implementing statutes before any treaty that appropriates money, defines
crimes, raises revenue, or declares war can take effect.2s During the height of
the Cold War in the 195os and 196os, when the United States signed on to a
wave of mutual defense and assistance treaties, administration officials
frequently invoked this rule to reassure Congress that no treaty could have the
effect of automatically bringing the country into a state of war.29 Despite fairly
25. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 12, at 8o9-1o.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3, 8; see, e.g., Trade-Mark Convention, U.S.-Austria-Hung.,
NOV. 25, 1871, 17 Stat. 917; Treaty with the Apaches, U.S.-Apache Nation of Indians, July 1,
1852, lo Stat. 979.
27. As early as 1796 the House insisted, in vain, upon its right to deliberate on treaties that
touched matters committed to the whole Congress. The issue came to a head again in 1887,
when the House achieved some concessions from the Senate that established that the House
must approve implementing legislation where a treaty would raise revenues and ended the
practice of regulating Native Americans through treaty. 2 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS'
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1506-1509
(1907).
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § ill, cIt. i,
Reporter's Note 6 (199o).
29. See North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 8ist Cong., pt. 1,
at 11 (1949) (testimony of Dean Acheson, Secretary of State) ("Under our Constitution, the
Congress alone has the power to declare war.").
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wide acceptance of this rule among courts and commentators,3" however, the
Constitution's text provides little basis for determining why treaties may
"legislate" in some areas where Congress also has authority, but not others.3
The war power presents that problem acutely; nothing in the Constitution's
text differentiates the war power, which can only be exercised by statute, from
other Article I, Section 8 powers, such as the power over foreign commerce,
that have regularly been exercised through treaty. Accordingly, it is hard to
craft a coherent, textually based rule that explains the widely accepted political
practice of deferring to Congress's paramount authority to legislate exclusively
on some subjects but not others.32
The political branches have responded to the treaty power's democratic
deficit by enlarging the role of the House of Representatives in approving
international agreements. Framework statutes now provide for the
participation of both houses of Congress in approving certain international
agreements, such as trade agreements.33 Further, in the last century many
international agreements that previously might have been secured through the
30. See LouiS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 159-161 (1972). Jordan Paust
notes that judicial decisions concerning the doctrine of statutory exclusion are extremely
rare. See Paust, supra note 17, at 778 n.uo. Several cases support some form of statutory
exclusion. See, e.g., British Caledonian Airways v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153, 116o (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(holding that appropriations are an exclusive power of Congress); Hopson v. Kreps, 622
F.2d 1375, 138o (9 th Cir. 198o) (crime); Edwards v. Carter, 58o F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (appropriations and war powers); Schroeder v. Bissell (The Over the Top), 5 F.2d 838,
845 (D. Conn. 1925) (revenue matters and crime).
31. See Paust, supra note 17, at 777-81.
32. Some have also suggested that the Constitution in fact requires that all Article I powers be
exercised exclusively by both houses, either through congressional-executive agreements or
by statutes implementing a treaty. See John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REv. 757, 838-43 (2001). Besides conflicting
with the long historical practice of using treaties to regulate trade, another power committed
to Congress under Article I, even modern constitutional practice cannot support a theory of
such exclusive statutory authority. For example, the Constitution vests Congress with the
power to "dispose of... property belonging to the United States," U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2, yet the Panama Canal was surrendered by the effect of a self-executing treaty in 1977.
Sixty members of the House of Representatives challenged the treaty as a violation of
Congress's exclusive statutory authority to dispose of U.S. lands, but the D.C. Circuit
rejected statutory exclusivity for any congressional power except the appropriations and war
powers. Edwards, 58o F.2d at 1058 n.7.
33. The House achieved perhaps its greatest victory in reclaiming statutory power through the
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 21O1-
2495 (2000)), which requires both houses to implement trade treaties. See Ackerman &
Golove, supra note 12, at 904-07.
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treaty power are now enacted through congressional-executive agreements, 1
reflecting a growing preference for having both houses participate in certain
kinds of lawmaking. This two-house process of congressional-executive
agreements is not specified in the Constitution, yet remains uncontroversial
today" largely because it more closely matches Americans' sense of the
democratic accountability of laws than the one-house treaty process created by
the framers., 6 The increasing trend toward using statutes and congressional-
executive agreements in lieu of treaties, therefore, reflects an extratextual
constitutional shift in how Americans understand their democracy and their
international commitments.
B. The Federalism Problem
The Constitution divides the legislative power between the states and the
federal government, but the treaty power resides only in the federal
government.3 7 As a result, treaties are not subject to the same federalism
limitations as statutory legislation. The Supreme Court affirmed this
interpretation of the treaty power more than eighty years ago in the seminal
case Missouri v. Holland.8 This nationalist view of the treaty power, however,
has enjoyed its share of detractors over the years, who have expressed anxiety
that a nationalist treaty power might create an unacceptable "back door"
around the constraints of the Tenth Amendment. As Professor David Golove
has demonstrated, this federalist critique of the treaty power has tended to
34. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 103D CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 14 (Comm. Print 1993) (noting that
between 193o and 1992, the United States entered into 14,o61 international agreements, of
which only 891 were formal treaties).
3S. One commentator attacked the use of congressional-executive agreements instead of treaties
during the contentious aftermath of the adoption of NAFTA by simple majorities of both
houses. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 1o8 HARv. L. REv. 1221 (1995). This position was
rejected with regard to NAFTA by the only court to consider it. See Made in the U.S.A.
Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1278-1323 (N.D. Ala. 1999), affid on other
grounds, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cit. 2ool). Congress's practice of using congressional-executive
agreements in place of treaties is well established today.
36. See HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 13, at 59-62 (expressing support for
congressional-executive agreements on the grounds of their "more democratic character");
Ackerman & Golove, supra note 12, at 803 (praising congressional-executive agreements as a
popular constitutional innovation to replace the "outmoded" and "antidemocratic" treaty
ratification process).
37. Golove, supra note 2, at 1078-79.
38. 252 U.S. 416,432 (1920).
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emerge most strongly during eras when treaties threatened to affect issues of
great social and political import, such as slavery during the antebellum period,
Asian immigrant rights during the late nineteenth century, or racial
segregation during the 195os and 196os. 39 In our own time, most who criticize
the nationalist view of the treaty power have focused on whether the treaty
power can be used to broaden civil rights commitments or alter the legality of
capital punishment.40 The Senate, with the support of the President, has
recently acted to limit the nationalist impact of human rights treaties by
attaching "federalism understandings" to treaties with civil rights provisions,
stating that these provisions would be implemented by either the federal
government or the states pursuant to their legislative roles.4"
Forests would weep over the amount of paper that has been devoted to
debating whether this anxiety is actually rooted in the Constitution itself and
therefore whether Missouri v. Holland was incorrectly decided. 42 Other scholars
have done an admirable job of refuting this contention, however, and I will not
attempt to reargue the case here.43 I would only note that those who have
claimed that the Constitution's text supports a hard federalism limit on the
treaty power have been curiously selective in their reasoning. Even if
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause was liberally construed, many
well-accepted exercises of the treaty power might not pass some proposed
"enumerated powers" test. For one, Congress generally cannot set limits on
39. Golove, supra note 2, at 1078-79.
40. See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8 (criticizing the domestic application of
human rights law by citing examples of human rights law provisions that resemble
constitutional bans on cruel and unusual punishment or civil rights); Jack Goldsmith,
Should International Human Rights Law Trump U.S. Domestic Law?, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 327
(2000) (same).
41. The reservations, declarations, and understandings attached to the ICCPR stated that "the
United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by the Federal
Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the
matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments...." S. COmm.
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. ExEc. REP. No. 102-23, at 18 (1992) [hereinafter RESERVATIONS TO
ICCPR]. With regard to the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. ExEc. Doc. No. C, 95-2 (1978), 66o
U.N.T.S. 195, the Senate explained that "[tlhere is no disposition to preempt these state and
local initiatives or to federalize the entire range of anti-discriminatory actions through the
exercise of the constitutional treaty power.... In some areas, it would be inappropriate to
do so." S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON
THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, S. EXEC. REP. No. 103-29, at 24
(1994).
42. See supra notes 2 and 9.
43. Golove, supra note 2, at 1093-97; see also Flaherty, supra note 2.
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how states prosecute crimes that occur within their borders, and yet states are
bound to respect the terms of an extradition agreement when the perpetrator is
apprehended in a foreign country.' Similarly, there seems to be no obvious
enumerated power that would allow Congress to immunize foreign officials
from prosecution under state law, yet this is exactly the effect of consular
treaties. 41 It is hard to believe, however, that today's critics of a nationalist
treaty power would lay waste to these treaties in the name of states' rights.
Ironically for the federalism advocates, the Supreme Court's decisions in Lopez
and its progeny,46 which have constricted Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause, have actually lent more vitality to a nationalist treaty power.
If the Constitution indeed forbade treaties that exceeded Congress's power
under Article I, then it is unlikely that extradition or consular treaties could
survive constitutional scrutiny.
The substantive selectivity of the federalist critique, in both its political and
academic forms, indicates that what is at stake is not a hard constitutional limit
on the exercise of the treaty power. Rather, the limit at issue is a more nuanced,
political one. The value of federalism may simply be more important in some
contexts than others. The federalists' objections therefore do not come from
any legal problem relating to treaties invading state powers per se, but from the
political or quasi-constitutional problem of whether the treaty power is an
acceptable vehicle to set national policy on highly contentious questions like
slavery, civil rights, or capital punishment. It is the political commitment to
federalism, and not the Constitution, that is therefore doing the work of
constraining the treaty power in this area.
47
44. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886) ("[A] person who has been
brought within the jurisdiction of the court, by virtue of proceedings under an extradition
treaty, can only be tried for one of the offences described in that treaty, and for the offense
with which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition....").
4S. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jerez, 457 N.E.2d 1105 (Mass. 1983) (affirming dismissal of
charges against a foreign consul for assault and battery upon a police officer because the
consul was engaged in the exercise of his consular function at the time of the altercation, and
therefore immune from prosecution under article 43 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261); cf State v. Doering-Sachs, 652 So.
2d 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the defendant foreign consul was not entitled
to diplomatic immunity for assault unless acting to carry out a "consular function" within
the meaning of article 43 of the Vienna Convention, supra).
46. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
47. See Hollis, supra note 20, at 1331-32 (arguing that the President generally respects principles
of federalism when ratifying treaties); Yoo, supra note 32, at 851 (rejecting federalism limits
on the treaty power but noting that federalism limits have "certain structural appeal").
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C. The Sovereignty Problem
The treaty power is often accused of threatening American sovereignty,
understood to mean America's control over its own lawmaking. Some have
argued, for example, that human rights treaties particularly erode our
commitment to self-government under the Bill of Rights4s and could have a
"destabilizing effect" on domestic law by creating an overlapping language of
rights that would need to be assimilated into our constitutional language.49 At
first glance, mere parallel incorporation of legal standards does not present an
obvious affront to American control of lawmaking, since the treaties themselves
are adopted through democratic, constitutional procedures. Treaty law,
however, is far more open to international interpretive influence than purely
domestic law,"0 thus making it a threat that sounds in the register of
sovereignty to some Americans."1 Obviously not all treaties that create domestic
legal standards provoke negative sovereigntist reactions, however. Americans
do not seem to feel a compelling national need to expound, say, aircraft liability
laws5" or foreign service of legal process rules" within a purely domestic
dialogue. Rather, the treaty commitments that provoke the most anxiety about
sovereignty are those that touch on constitutional concepts like equal
protection, free speech, due process, or limits on criminal punishment.54
48. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 458.
49- Id. at 420.
so. Even conservative, prosovereignty jurists like Antonin Scalia have argued that treaties
should not be interpreted in isolation from the meaning given to them by foreign courts. See
Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When we
interpret a treaty, we accord the judgments of our sister signatories 'considerable weight."'
(quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985))).
si. Kaufman describes hearings where members of Congress expressed numerous concerns
about the potential impact on U.S. sovereignty of incorporating the U.N. Charter directly
into domestic law. See KAUFMAN, supra note 21, at 49-59.
52. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 12 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
53. Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.
54. For a representative sample of these arguments, see 1979 Hearings, supra note io; Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 414-15 (arguing against self-execution by noting that the ICCPR
contains "dozens of vaguely worded rights guarantees that differ in important linguistic
details from the analogous guarantees under U.S. domestic law"); Goldsmith, supra note 40,
at 327-29; and Rosenkranz, supra note 9, at 1871-73.
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Of course, the Supreme Court has long held that treaty law cannot
"amend" or diminish constitutional rights.5 Treaties can, however, potentially
destabilize national understandings about constitutional rights that were, in
many cases, hard won and still contested. The Fourteenth Amendment, for
example, is not the same as article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which "prohibit[s] any discrimination... on any ground
such as race,"56 nor does the First Amendment map directly onto ICCPR article
19(2), which protects the individual's right to "receive and impart information
and ideas of all kinds... through any.., media of his choice." 7 If both
regimes of law applied to the same jurisdiction, therefore, judges would not
only have to analyze affirmative action programs or campaign finance laws for
how they comport with constitutional guarantees, but also determine whether
they violate the broader language of the ICCPR. To the extent that a treaty
may set a higher legal standard than an analogous constitutional right, it would
seem to be "amending" the American understanding of that right. Further, in
determining the contours of a right guaranteed by treaty, judges look to the
law of other signatory states, not just American law. 8 It is precisely this
possibility for dialogic interaction and influence that makes treaty law so
attractive for human rights proponents, but it is also what creates anxiety
among those whose political identity is founded in a strong sense of national
political self-determination. 9
Since the late 1970s, the Senate has responded to this sovereigntist anxiety
by attaching reservations and understandings to nearly every human rights
treaty it has ratified, precisely to prevent the development of an overlapping
language of fundamental rights. These reservations either state that the treaty's
provisions shall be interpreted in line with existing constitutional provisions,"
thereby shielding domestic law from change, or else state that the treaty's
55. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion) ("There is nothing in [the
Supremacy Clause's] language which intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to
them do not have to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.").
56. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 26, Dec. 16, 1966, S. ExEc. Doc.
No. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 [hereinafter ICCPR].
57- Id. art. 178.
58. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (noting that when a court interprets a
treaty, the "opinions of our sister signatories" are given "considerable weight").
59. See Paul W. Kahn, The Question of Soveregnty, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 259 (2004).
60. See, e.g., RESERVATIONS TO ICCPR, supra note 41, at 7 (noting that "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment" should be understood as encompassing the treatment
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments); S. COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, REPORT ON CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. ExEc. REP. No. 101-30 (1990) (same).
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terms are non-self-executing and therefore unenforceable as domestic law.6'
While this is disheartening for those who see benefit in tying domestic rights
to international law norms, Americans - at least as represented by the President
and Senate-have shown little enthusiasm for this project. For the time being,
it seems that elaboration through the Bill of Rights remains the only
domestically acceptable way of making national fundamental law.
D. Separation of Powers and the Judiciary's Role in Enforcing Treaty Rights
Finally, others critique the treaty power because, they claim, it threatens to
unbalance the relationship between the political and judicial branches by
inviting the judiciary to "interfere" with foreign affairs, assumed to be the
domain of the political branches of government. 62 This critique differs from the
previous three in that it does not relate to the question of how the President
and Senate should exercise the treaty power, but rather solely to the question of
how treaty law should be enforced as law by the judicial branch. Although
Article VI declares that treaties are the law of the land, a court will not consider
a treaty-based right to be judicially enforceable until it first determines whether
the treaty is self-executing- that is, whether it "import[s] a contract" or
"operates of itself' 63 -and then determines whether the treaty confers rights
capable of being enforced by individuals. 64 These questions are not unique to
treaty law, since courts are often called upon to determine whether a statute or
even the Constitution itself is self-executing and creates an individually
enforceable right.6 s
Even though courts have well-worn doctrine at their disposal that helps
them determine whether statutes confer individual rights, they resist applying
those same frameworks to treaties.66 Instead, they often simply announce that
61. President Carter first suggested that treaties could be declared non-self-executing,
something he proposed as a way of breaking the Senate's deadlock over several human
rights treaties. See Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Four
Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, S. Exrc. Doc. No. 95-2, at vi (1978) ("With such
declarations, the substantive provisions of the treaties would not of themselves become
effective as domestic law."). Every President since Carter has followed suit.
62. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 8.
63. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
64. See Vizquez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 17, for an incisive analysis about the proper
framework for understanding how courts should determine whether a treaty creates rights
capable of individual enforcement.
65. See id.
66. See, e.g., Cornejo v. County of San Diego, No. 05-56202, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22616, at
*13-14 & n.9 (9 th Cir. Sept. 24, 2007) (noting that Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273
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"generally, '' 6, "traditionally," 68 or "as a rule''69 a treaty does not create rights
capable of being enforced by individuals. This oft-cited "presumption"7"
against treaty rights is sometimes declared to flow from a "constitutional
arrangement" that "generally plac[es] the powers that relate to foreign
relations in the Executive Branch."71 The only problem with this argument - as
four Justices of the Supreme Court recently noted-is that "no such
presumption exists."72 This presumption against treaty rights appears to have
only surfaced in the last fifteen years and cannot be traced directly to any
Supreme Court case, let alone any constitutional provision. 73 Courts that
bother to cite this proposition at all tend to root it in the 123-year-old Head
Money Cases, which only established that federal statutes passed subsequent to
treaties supersede them.74 The Justices of the Supreme Court have never
(2002), which provides a framework for determining whether statutes confer individual
rights, "does not purport to answer the question before us, which concerns how a treaty is to
be interpreted. Treaties are different from statutes, and come with their own rules of the
road.").
67. E.g., United States v. Li, 206 F. 3d 56, 6o (ist Cir. 2000) ("[T]reaties do not generally create
rights that are privately enforceable in the federal courts.").
68. E.g., Hamdan v. RIumsfeld, 415 F. 3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[T]his country has
traditionally negotiated treaties with the understanding that they do not create judicially
enforceable individual rights.").
69. See, e.g., Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 327 (D.D.C. 2005) ("Treaties, as a general rule,
are not privately enforceable.").
70. See, e.g., United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 389 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[C]ourts
presume that the rights created by an international treaty belong to a state and that a private
individual cannot enforce them."); United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 197 (sth
Cir. 2001) (noting, without citing authority, that when a treaty's terms are ambiguous "the
presumption against implying private rights comes into play"); State v. Sanchez-Llamas,
io8 P. 3d 573, 575-76 (Or. 2005) (citing primarily Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 58o (1884), for
a "presumption against" the creation of individual rights), affd, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (20o6). But
see Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 379 (7 th Cir. 2005) (citing the Head Money Cases in order to
reach the conclusion that a treaty does confer individual rights).
71. Sanchez-Llamas, 1o8 P.3d at 576.
72. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2697 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73. Although it is hard to pinpoint the provenance of the rule, the Fourth Circuit in Goldstar
(Panama) S.A. v. United States was one of the first courts to state flatly that "[i]nternational
treaties are not presumed to create rights that are privately enforceable." 967 F.2d 965, 968
(4th Cir. 1992). Many circuits today, if they bother to cite this rule at all, either cite to
Goldstar or to cases that themselves relied on Goldstar. See, e.g.,Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 197
(citing United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60 (lst Cir. 2000), which cites Goldstar).
74- 112 U.S. at 598-99. The Head Money Cases established the so-called last-in-time rule, id. at
597, which provides that a later statute prevails over a prior inconsistent treaty provision.
Although the Court did note in dicta that a treaty "is primarily a compact between
independent nations," it also explained that a treaty "may also contain provisions which
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embraced this supposed "presumption" against treaty rights, yet the Court has
twice ducked the opportunity to clarify whether the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations gives aliens a judicially enforceable right to have their
consulate notified when they are detained, despite the treaty's clear
requirement that authorities shall inform a detained person without delay of
his right to counsel.7" Similarly, the Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld did not reach
the question of whether the 1949 Geneva Conventions create individually
enforceable rights, holding only that they had been incorporated by reference
into a statutory scheme.7
6
This frequent resort to a "presumption" against treaty rights with no clear
basis in law indicates that policy concerns are afoot. Courts, of course, are less
likely than the other two branches to explain their political motivations, so
instead they tend to leave behind only vague warnings that enforcing treaty
rights "risks aggrandizing the power of the judiciary and interfering in the
nation's foreign affairs,' a decision that could create "[i]ncalculable
mischief."'7 8 It is not clear, however, why enforcing treaty rights would do any
more "mischief' to foreign affairs than enforcing rights created by a statute
implementing a treaty. Since both would be a product of the same foreign affairs
concerns, the only difference between the two would be a treaty's presumed
democratic infirmities. 79 Further, it is not clear why the judicial branch
necessarily assumes that enforcing treaty rights "interferes with" foreign
relations, since the political branches have sometimes explicitly decided to
advance international relations by depoliticizing foreign policy-related
decisions. This is exactly what Congress did in 1976 when it removed the State
confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the
territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are
capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country," and that in
such situations a "court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it
would to a statute." Id. at 598-99.
7s. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36., Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669; Medellin v.
Dretke, 544 U.S. 66o (2005).
76. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2794 (2006).
77. United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 394 (6th Cir. 2001).
78. Li, 206 F.3d at 68 (Selya, J., and Boudin, J., concurring).
7g. For example, most courts refused to treat the Convention Against Torture's (CAT)
nonrefoulement provisions as self-executing law, e.g., Calderon v. Reno, 39 F. Supp. 2d 943
(N.D. Ill. 1998), but have enforced the provisions of the statute implementing CAT's
nonrefoulement provisions. For example, the Supreme Court enforced such provisions in
Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005), which noted that even an
alien who was otherwise barred from relief could still seek withholding of removal under the
statute and federal regulations implementing the CAT. Id. at 346-48.
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Department's discretion to grant immunity to foreign sovereigns and made
immunity decisions subject to legal standards interpreted and applied by
courts.s By enforcing laws like the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,s the
judicial branch does not interfere with political-branch control over foreign
affairs because the political branches fully intended to eliminate their discretion
over such matters by delegating control to the courts.2
Unlike the other three critiques of treaties, therefore, this criticism is not
traceable to any unique constitutional distinction between treaties and statutes.
Concerns about foreign affairs are no doubt important to the courts, but their
particular hostility to enforcing treaties (as opposed to enforcing other forms of
law that touch on foreign affairs) is likely a cover for the other three
constitutional concerns discussed. The judges' underlying motivation seems
not to be the relationship of the treaty to foreign affairs alone, but their sense of
the legitimacy of treaties as domestic sources of law. Although the argument
that judicial enforcement of treaties somehow transgresses a constitutional
norm on separation of powers has proven particularly powerful before the
lower courts, ironically, it is the only question the Constitution itself clearly
addresses. Article VI may arguably be vague on whether statutes have exclusive
realms, or whether treaties ought to be subject to the limits of the enumerated
powers of Congress, the Tenth Amendment, or even the Bill of Rights. But it is
not vague on whether treaties and statutes should be interpreted and applied as
coequal sources of law. Although there certainly may be treaties that are
inappropriate for judicial enforcement because of the particular way they
implicate foreign affairs -just as there may be statutes that are inappropriate
for enforcement for the same reason -blanket rules are no more appropriate in
the former case than the latter.
8o. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 16o2 (2006) ("The Congress
finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims of foreign states to
immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of justice and would
protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United States courts.").
si. Id.
82. See generally Aron Ketchel, Note, Deriving Lessons for the Alien Tort Claims Act from the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 191 (2007) (explaining that Congress's
purpose in enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was to eliminate Executive
Branch discretion over decisions to confer immunity on foreign states).
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II. THE CASE FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT OF TREATY
RIGHTS
As discussed, the treaty power today tends to provoke anxieties about the
role of the House of Representatives in lawmaking, the nation's commitment
to constitutional language as the sole exposition of fundamental individual
rights, the appropriate roles of the states and the federal government within
our constitutional system, and the judiciary's proper role in foreign affairs. All
three branches of government have attempted to ameliorate these anxieties
through an evolving tableau of legal doctrines and political tactics. The House
of Representatives has reasserted itself through increased use of congressional-
executive agreements. The Senate and the President have attached
"reservations and understandings" to every human rights treaty" since the
mid-twentieth century, often both to state that its provisions will be
interpreted in line with existing domestic law and to proclaim the treaty non-
self-executing in the courts. The judiciary, meanwhile, has adopted a
presumption against treaty enforcement with increasing fervor, holding treaty
rights to be unenforceable even when the Senate had entered no express
reservation and the language of the treaty confers rights to individuals on its
face.84 Some have praised these tactics as sensible ways of protecting
constitutional values like popular sovereignty,8" while others bemoan America's
isolation from an evolving body of rights-based international law. 6 No one,
however, has analyzed what kinds of treaty rights, claimed where and by
whom, are likely to implicate these values of democracy, sovereignty,
federalism, or separation of powers. This Part argues that while these values
might have some traction when treaties are applied domestically, they have
almost no salience when they are applied to American conduct abroad.
83. One notable exception is the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, lO2 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. The Senate did not declare the
Convention non-self-executing, but made its consent conditional on withholding the
ratifying instruments until implementing legislation had been passed. President Reagan
submitted the ratifying instruments after signing the Genocide Convention Implementation
Act into law on November 4, 1988. See Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987:
President's Remarks, 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 38 (1989).
84. See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 685 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
plain reading of the Vienna Convention gives aliens the right to consular notification).
85. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8; Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 8.
86. See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 13; Paust, supra note 17.
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A. Congress's and the States'Roles in Regulating Foreign Affairs
As described, one frequent criticism of the treaty power is that it usurps the
role of the House of Representatives in regulating domestic affairs, particularly
when the treaty creates individually enforceable rights for individuals, a
quintessentially legislative endeavor. But while it is true that Congress would
generally be the prime mover behind any federal effort to create new rights
domestically, it is far less certain that this is true extraterritorially. Under the
framework established by Justice Jackson in his famous concurrence in the Steel
Seizure case, the President and Congress generally share constitutional
responsibility for the government's conduct in foreign affairs."s Where
Congress has been silent, the President retains broad authority to act without
express authorization, even if he could not undertake those same actions at
home without congressional authorization. Further, there are likely narrow
areas where the President possesses exclusive authority to act, even contrary to
the will of Congress. 8 President George W. Bush, for example, has claimed
exclusive authority to manage much of the war on terror without interference
from Congress, including conducting international and domestic warrantless
surveillance, 9 detaining alleged terrorists without judicial review both inside
and outside the United States, 90 and setting standards for the treatment of
detainees. 9' Further, Bush has asserted this authority by attaching "signing
87. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
88. The Supreme Court has never defined the President's exclusive authority under the
Commander-in-Chief Clause, but it may include, at a minimum, the authority to direct
troops in the field, to place or remove military equipment, or to recognize foreign leaders
and consular officials. See Adam Cohen, Just What the Founders Feared: An Imperial President
Goes to War, N.Y. TtMES, July 23, 2007, at A18 (arguing that the Commander-in-Chief
Clause only gives the President the exclusive authority to "command and direct[]" military
forces).
89. See Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the
Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 20o6),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/dojoilgo6.pdf (arguing that the "President has
inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrantless searches and surveillance within the
United States").
go. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 14, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No.
03-1027) (arguing that the "long-settled authority of the Commander in Chief to seize and
detain enemy combatants is not limited to aliens or foreign battlefields").
91. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Regarding Legal Standards Applicable Under 18
U.S.C. §§ 234o-234oA (Aug. 1, 2002) (arguing that any congressional statute proposing to
limit the President's authority to conduct interrogations during a time of war would be
unconstitutional), available at http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj/bybee8olo2mem
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statements" to more than 750 provisions of bills passed by Congress, often to
object that the provision was constitutionally deficient (and, by implication,
null and void) because it interfered with the President's exclusive powers as
Commander in Chief.
92
Congress in recent years has shown little interest in challenging this limited
view of its role in regulating the nation's conduct abroad. When the Supreme
Court held that President Bush acted illegally by creating military commissions
that did not comply with the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 93 Congress not
only ratified the President's program by passing the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 (MCA), 94 but some members sought to acknowledge his inherent
authority to ignore Congress.9" The MCA ultimately did assert some
congressional authority to regulate military commissions, but acknowledged
the President's inherent authority to establish tribunals in occupied territories
or areas under martial law.9 6 Although one need not subscribe to such a broad
view of the President's exclusive authority over foreign affairs, President Bush's
largely successful effort to consolidate power over foreign affairs in the
executive branch indicates that Congress's ability to direct the government
extraterritorially is neither firmily established nor widely respected. And if
Congress has no power to set limits on the treatment of detainees held
.pdf [hereinafter Bybee Memo]. The Bybee memo was partly rescinded by a later DOJ
memo. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to James B. Comey, Deputy Att'y Gen., Regarding Legal Standards Applicable
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-234oA (Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/
18usc234o234oa2.htm [hereinafter Levin Memo].
92. See Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws: President Cites Power of His Office,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at Ai; see also AM. BAR ASS'N, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL
SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 15 (20o6),
http ://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba.final-signing-statements-recommend
ation-report_7-24-o6.pdf (noting that over ioo of such challenges related to the president's
asserted exclusive authority over foreign affairs or his authority as Commander in Chief).
93. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006) (invalidating the President's
commissions and holding that "in undertaking to try Hamdan and subject him to criminal
punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with the Rule of Law that prevails in this
jurisdiction"); see also Uniform Code of Military Justice, 1o U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000).
94. Military Commissions Act of 2o6, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified at lo
U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w).
95. See, e.g., Unprivileged Combatant Act of 2oo6, S. 3614, logth Cong. § 1(c)(3) (20o6)
(authorizing the President to create military commissions while noting that "[t] he President
has inherent authority to convene military tribunals arising from his role as Commander
and Chief of the Armed Forces under article II of the Constitution").
96. Military Commissions Act of2006 § 2, 120 Stat. at 2600 (to be codified at 1o U.S.C. § 946a
note).
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overseas,"7 for example, then creating self-executing legal rights for such
individuals under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) 8 would in no way
infringe upon Congress's legislative role.
Just as the extraterritorial enforcement of treaty rights would do little
damage to the prerogatives of the House of Representatives, it would certainly
do no damage at all to our federal system of government. Even if the treaty
power were subject to the full constraints of the Tenth Amendment, no one
would argue that regulating the government's conduct abroad is a power
reserved to the states. To the contrary, a state's authority to regulate foreign
affairs is subject to broad federal preemption, even when that state enacts laws
that only affect individuals within its own territorial bounds. 9 Creating self-
executing extraterritorial treaty rights, therefore, in no way threatens to
undermine the federal system, since states' power to regulate outside their
sovereign territory is already extremely limited.
B. Sovereignty and Parallel Regimes of Fundamental Law
Concerns about sovereignty and the stability of domestic laws also
diminish significantly when one considers the extraterritorial enforcement of
treaties that create individual rights. As mentioned in Section I.C, many who
criticize human rights treaties fear that they will erode our commitment to self-
government under the Bill of Rights1"' and have a "destabilizing effect" on
domestic law, since they would create distinct and separate rights to, say, "free
speech" or "due process" outside of the trusty and familiar language of the First
97. See Bybee Memo, supra note 91, at 31 (arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 234oA (2000), which makes
it a crime for anyone outside the United States to commit or attempt to commit torture,
would be "unconstitutional if it impermissibly encroached on the President's constitutional
power to conduct a military campaign"). Although the Bybee Memo has been partly
rescinded, the Office of Legal Counsel did not supersede the part of the memo concerning
the President's power under the Commander-in-Chief Clause. See Levin Memo, supra note
91, 4.
98. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 1O, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 113
[hereinafter CAT].
99. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that the
Massachusetts Burma Act, Mass. Gen. Laws §§ 7:22G-7:22M, 40 F 1/2 (1997)), which
prohibited awarding state contracts to companies doing business in Burma, was preempted
by federal law because it was an obstacle to Congress's attempt to delegate to the President
the authority to impose sanctions on Burma).
loo. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 458.
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and Fifth Amendments."' If these treaty-based provisions were construed
more broadly than their constitutional counterparts, Americans would soon
find that the landscape of their basic rights was being shaped more by treaty
law than constitutional law.
When one looks to the possibility of enforcing human rights guarantees
only extraterritorially, however, these overlapping rights regimes turn into
alternative rights regimes. Even assuming that the CAT's ban on "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment"' 2 differs in some substantive way from the
conduct prohibited by the Eighth and Fifth Amendments-and assuming a
judge might ignore the Senate's reservation defining this provision as
coextensive with the Eighth and Fifth Amendments - aliens outside the United
States may simply not be able to claim Eighth or Fifth Amendment rights.'
Although there is considerable debate over the extraterritorial application of
constitutional rights, 1 4 the Supreme Court has at times seized on the fact that
the Constitution speaks of rights held by "the People" and limited its
protections to the citizens or, at most, certain individuals within the United
States' territorial jurisdiction.' 5 Indeed, the Supreme Court has never allowed
an alien outside the United States to claim a constitutional right and seems
unlikely to do so in the future °6 Therefore, even insofar as a judge might
1o1. Id. at 420.
1o2. CAT, supra note 98, art. 16.
1o3. Although the possible extraterritorial application of constitutional rights to noncitizens
remains controversial, the Supreme Court has generally resisted giving the Constitution
such extraterritorial effect. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(199o) (denying that aliens abroad may claim Fourth Amendment rights). Further, the
Supreme Court's opinion in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), has often been read
as holding that aliens outside the United States may not claim Fifth Amendment rights.
Although some commentators have read Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), as casting
doubt on Eisentrager, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantinamo: The Law of
International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REv. 657, 752 (2oo6), the Supreme Court has
not yet reached the question of whether the Guantanamo detainees may claim any
substantive constitutional rights when filing habeas corpus petitions.
104. See, e.g., GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW lO8-17 (1996) (arguing that the Constitution represents a positive
restriction on government and hence protects aliens when the United States acts abroad).
ios. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 259-71 (holding that the Fourth Amendment's protections
extend only to "the people," a narrower category than "persons" or "the accused," and hence
do not apply to aliens abroad).
1o6. Some lower courts have read Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), more broadly to allow aliens
abroad to claim some constitutional rights. See, e.g., Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (holding that Micronesians may claim Fifth Amendment rights in the adjudication of
property values destroyed by U.S. military activities); In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355
F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that Guantanamo detainees have Fifth Amendment
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define a broadly worded human rights provision differently from a comparably
worded constitutional provision, she could do so extraterritorially without
changing or modifying our domestic "constitutional grammar." Furthermore,
by extending treaty rights to aliens abroad she could avoid having to make
difficult decisions about the Constitution's extraterritorial reach. Treaty rights
could become an alternative rights regime that governs the United States when
it acts abroad, while leaving the Constitution's provisions as the sole language
for defining domestic rights.
C. Separation of Powers and Presidential Authority in Foreign Affairs
As described in Section I.D, when courts hold treaties non-self-executing or
presume that they do not create individually enforceable rights, they often
cite-if only obliquely-their reluctance to become involved with foreign
affairs. Certainly, the argument that Presidents need a free hand in foreign
affairs might seem most compelling when a President is acting abroad.
However, Presidents have several important and redundant checks on the
treaty-making process that ensure that they retain ultimate control over the
conduct of foreign affairs even when constrained by treaty law. Therefore the
judicial enforcement of treaties, surprisingly, raises fewer separation of powers
concerns than the judicial enforcement of statutes. First, and most importantly,
a treaty can be initiated by the President alone." 7 Unlike ordinary legislation,
which can be enacted over presidential veto, treaties can only originate in the
White House. Second, Presidents maintain far greater ongoing control over
treaties than statutes, since the terms of many treaties depend on political
determinations and interpretations made-within reason-by the executive
branch."s Courts have traditionally given the President's interpretation of
ambiguous treaty terms considerable weight;0 9 further, if a treaty prescribes
certain obligations toward foreign consular officials or heads of state, the
rights), vacated sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding
that "the Constitution does not confer rights on aliens without property or presence within
the United States"), cert. granted 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
107. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
lo8. See Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913) (upholding presidential authority to determine
when a treaty is void for breach).
log. See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) ("Although not
conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged
with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.... When the parties to a
treaty both agree as to the meaning of a treaty provision, and that interpretation follows
from the clear treaty language, we must, absent extraordinarily strong contrary evidence,
defer to that interpretation.").
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President still retains the authority to determine who will be officially
recognized as such."' Third, many treaties- from mutual assistance treaties to
weapons agreements -simply do not create individually enforceable rights.'
Treaties that truly prescribe the rights and responsibilities of states toward each
other will simply never end up in the courtroom.
The most important distinction between treaties and statutes, however, is
that Presidents not only control the way "in" to a treaty, they also have an
"out." Courts have upheld the President's power to unilaterally withdraw from
treaties or declare them void for breach. 12 Hence, if adherence to the treaty's
terms becomes contrary to the country's interests, the President alone
possesses the constitutional authority to renounce the treaty. The President's
power to repeal a treaty unilaterally should not be confused with the power to
selectively disobey, however. "3 There is value in making the President obey his
own commitments - or the commitments of his predecessors - even when he
has the power to renounce them, just as there is value in enforcing statutory
law even though Congress can repeal it. A positive act of political will generally
requires an equal act of political will to renounce, since renunciation of laws is
an information-forcing mechanism that allows for greater democratic
accountability in a way that total freedom of action does not.
Enforcing treaty rights extraterritorially, then, diminishes the executive's
freedom to act only to the extent that it has already been surrendered by
himself or his predecessors. Although treaty enforcement does restrain a
110. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (giving the President the power to "receive Ambassadors and other
public Ministers"); see also Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 707-08 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc)
("It is undisputed that the Constitution gave the President full constitutional authority to
recognize.., and to derecognize [foreign governments]."), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
'in. See Vi.quez, Treaty-Based Rights, supra note 17, at 1140.
i. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d 697 (upholding President Carter's termination of a mutual
assistance treaty with the Republic of China without the Senate's advice and consent). In
June 2001, President Bush unilaterally withdrew the United States from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. A lawsuit by thirty-one U.S. lawmakers protesting this action was dismissed.
Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d i (D.D.C. 2002). Some scholars, however, have suggested
that the President should not be able to withdraw from treaties without the Senate's advice
and consent. See Bruce Ackerman, Op-Ed., Treaties Don't Belong to Presidents Alone, N.Y.
TimEs, Aug. 29, 2001, at A23.
113. An analogous idea was put forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974), which held that the Attorney General was bound to follow his own rules so long
as they remained in force, even if he had the power to revoke those rules. Id. at 696 ("[I]t is
theoretically possible for the Attorney General to amend or revoke the regulation defining
the Special Prosecutor's authority. But he has not done so. So long as this regulation
remains in force the Executive Branch is bound by it, and indeed the United States as the
sovereign composed of the three branches is bound to respect and to enforce it." (footnote
omitted)).
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possibly unfettered foreign affairs power, particularly in the extraterritorial
context, this continuity of obligations from administration to administration
represents, I would argue, one of the primary benefits of treaties. They allow a
President to commit not only himself, but also his successors in office to a
course of action that must be followed until a future President gathers the
political will to renounce it. This gives a treaty the legal and constitutional
weight that mere policy statements lack. The very point of the Supremacy
Clause is to allow Presidents to write foreign affairs commitments into law.
Treaties, enforced by courts, can thus be seen as a tool in the President's
foreign affairs arsenal, not a limitation.
D. The Extraterritorial Reach of Treaty Law
A final objection may be raised, which is whether treaties even apply
abroad. Certainly a good number of statutes, and even provisions of the
Constitution itself, do not extend extraterritorially. 114 The Supreme Court will
generally assume that statutes are not intended to apply extraterritorially out of
respect for the principle of international comity and a presumption that
Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.11 This
presumption is already becoming outdated in our globalizing world, however;
it certainly makes little sense to apply it to treaties. Multilateral human rights
treaties by their very nature set out to create broadly shared standards of basic
law, and thus do not pose conflict-of-laws problems. Furthermore, it is hard to
imagine that the President proposes and the Senate ratifies a treaty with only
domestic concerns in mind, since the treaty itself is an instrument designed to
create universal, international standards of conduct. Indeed, since the United
States often insists that its domestic laws are already in full compliance with
most human rights treaties, the main purpose of signing the treaty is to
encourage international harmonization of fundamental rights principles." 6
The plain language of human rights treaties makes clear that they aim to
set standards not just on how a government must treat its own citizens, but on
114. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (denying that aliens
abroad may claim Fourth Amendment rights).
115. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 & n.5 (1993) (noting that the statutory
presumption against extraterritoriality is grounded both in international comity and the
'commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind");
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (noting that the presumption
against extraterritoriality helps avoid "unintended clashes between our laws and those of
other nations which could result in international discord").
116. For example, there could be no serious question that at the time the United States ratified
the Genocide Convention, its domestic laws did not already forbid mass murder.
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how it must treat all who come under the power of the state. The ICCPR's
preamble states that it articulates rights that "derive from the inherent dignity
of the human person,' ' 17 and binds the state parties to deprive "[n]o one" of
the right to life," 8 the right to be free from torture, "  and the right to be free
from slavery, 2 ' among other basic rights. When the ICCPR's rights logically
would apply only to citizens-such as certain political rights, like voting
rights -the treaty includes specific limiting language. 2' Both the U.N. Human
Rights Committee and the International Court of Justice have entered opinions
indicating that the ICCPR is intended to apply to all those within the power of
the state party. " Treaties that guarantee rights to individuals, therefore, rarely
speak in the kind of language that would limit the rights to only citizens.
It is true that the Supreme Court held in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council
2 3
that article 33 of the Refugee Convention,": prohibiting refoulement of refugees,
had no effect outside the United States. 2 s It did so, however, based on a
close-and arguably strained- textual reading of article 33 itself. Citing both
French and English dictionaries, the Court in Sale insisted that the treaty's
language forbidding a state to "expel or return" refugees to a territory where
they may face persecution applied only to refugees who had entered the United
States, since one could not "expel or return" someone who had never been
present in this country."6 The merits of this holding are certainly open for
117. ICCPR, supra note 56, pmbl.
118. Id. art. 6(1).
119. Id. art. 7.
12o. Id. art. 8.
121. Id. art. 25 (committing the state parties to guarantee "[e]very citizen" the right to participate
in public affairs).
122. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 18o (July 9) (concluding that ICCPR
obligations apply "in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside
its own territory"); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, lo, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26,
2004) (arguing that ICCPR rights apply not only to persons within a member state's
territory but also "to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party
acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective
control was obtained"); see also Theodor Meron, Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1995) (arguing that the ICCPR extends extraterritorial rights to areas
where the signatory government exercises effective power).
123. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
124. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention).
125. 509 U.S. at 179.
126. Id. at 18o-82.
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debate,127 but at the very least, this decision alone does not support the
proposition that all human rights treaties should be construed as having only
domestic application.12 Further, the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul v.
Bush, which held that Guantanamo Bay is within the territorial jurisdiction of
the federal courts because the United States exercises "plenary and exclusive
jurisdiction" there,129 indicates that international treaties that contain similar
jurisdictional provisions ought to be construed, at a minimum, to apply to
places like Guantanamo Bay. A presumption against the extraterritorial
application of treaty rights, therefore, is not logically or legally tenable. Courts
have the power to apply treaty law as substantive law abroad, absent an express
reservation to the contrary by the Senate. 3'
III. THE CASE FOR ENFORCING TREATY RIGHTS SPECIFIC TO ALIENS
As explained in Part II, few of the constitutional values most cited by
opponents of the treaty power are jeopardized by the individual enforcement of
treaty rights outside the United States. Not only is the role of the House of
Representatives in legislating extraterritorially not firmly established, but the
extraterritorial application of these treaties has no impact on the constitutional
value of federalism and does not implicate self-governance under the Bill of
Rights like the domestic application of human rights law would. Arguments
against the enforcement of treaty rights are also notably weaker when one
considers treaties that create rights that necessarily apply only to aliens. Such
127. See id. at 191 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I find this tortured reading [of the word 'return']
unsupported and unnecessary."); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Reflections on Refoulement and
Haitian Centers Council, 35 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 17 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
construction of article 33 in Sale "is inexplicable as a matter of international law"); The
Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARv. L. REV. 144, 353 (1993) (discussing Sale
and noting that the Court's use of the presumption against extraterritoriality in treaty
interpretation was "a novel development without basis in accepted canons of treaty
construction").
128. But see John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1229-30 (2004)
(arguing that Sale supports the proposition that "it makes no sense" to construe the CAT as
applying extraterritorially to the transfer of terrorist detainees overseas).
129. 542 U.S. 466, 475 (2004).
13o. This is contrary to the current official position of the U.S. government. See JUDGE ADVOCATE
GEN.'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 50 (Maj. Derek I. Grimes, Maj.
John Rawcliffe & Capt. Jeannine Smith eds., 20o6), available at
http://www.au.af.mi/au/awc/awcgate/law/oplaw-hdbk.pdf ("[A]s a matter of policy the
United States interprets human rights treaties to apply to persons living in the territory of
the United States, and not to any person with whom agents of our government deal in the
international community.").
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rights include the right not to be deported to a country where one would be
tortured or persecuted,' 1 the right to have one's consulate notified when
detained in a foreign country,'32 or the right to receive certain treatment if one
is captured as a combatant or noncombatant on a field of battle.'33 Although
there is a stronger argument here than in the extraterritorial context that both
houses of Congress ought to be involved in creating rights for aliens
domestically, these treaties implicate few of the constitutional values that
concern opponents of the treaty power, while providing essential protections
for a discrete and disadvantaged minority.
A. Sovereignty and Nonfundamental Law
Treaties that regulate rights unique to aliens do not create the kinds of
overlapping regimes of fundamental rights that are the primary concern of
sovereigntists. As demonstrated in Section I.C, those who oppose the treaty
power on the grounds that it threatens American sovereignty do not apply this
critique broadly to all treaty law. Little hue and cry, for example, has ever been
raised over the fact that airlines' liability to U.S. citizens in U.S. courts can be
governed by the standards laid out in a self-executing treaty such as the
Warsaw Convention. 34 Rather, it is treaties that would create fundamental
rights similar to-yet different from-those ensconced in the Bill of Rights,
that tend to earn this opprobrium. The Bill of Rights, however, contains no
provision roughly equivalent to the right to consular notification or
nonrefoulement. Accordingly, these rights do not conflict with or upset
understandings of constitutional law concepts like equal protection, cruel and
unusual punishment, due process, or free speech.
The country has been engaged in the project of elaborating aliens' rights
through treaties for the better part of two centuries, and few of these treaties
have been accused of posing any serious threat to American sovereignty. In the
nineteenth century, the government regularly signed treaties that gave aliens
equal rights to purchase or inherit property and protected their religious or
burial rights.'35 In the twentieth century, the United States ratified treaties that
131. CAT, supra note 98, art. 3.
132. See Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 36.
133. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
134. See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 646 (2004) (applying article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention to determine Olympic Airways's liability to plaintiffs in an air
"accident" over international waters); see also Warsaw Convention, supra note 52.
135. See Golove, supra note 2, at 124o.
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ensure immunity for consular officials' 36 and guarantee aliens the right to have
their consulate notified when they are detained by the police.137 Clearly, these
treaties do not affect American citizens' understanding of their own rights
under the Bill of Rights. It is true that in the early twentieth century, a bilateral
friendship treaty with Japan briefly spurred debate over whether San Francisco
was barred from creating separate schools for Japanese schoolchildren,13 8
pursuant to Plessy v. Ferguson's separate-but-equal holding. 3 9 However, the
issue quickly blew over when President Theodore Roosevelt convinced San
Francisco to drop its ordinance, 14' and Plessy remained unchallenged law for
another fifty years. 41 Aside from this brief intersection with the debate over the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, however, treaties that guarantee
special rights to aliens have rarely challenged domestic understandings of the
definitions of rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights.
B. Federalism and Federal Control over Immigration
Treaties that guarantee rights unique to aliens are also unlikely to disturb
traditional notions of federalism, since the federal government has exercised a
near-monopoly over laws governing immigrants and aliens since the late
nineteenth century. 42 In De Canas v. Bica, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this
broad view of federal immigration authority, holding that state laws
concerning immigration are broadly preempted by federal law, so long as
Congress intended to "occupy the field" of immigration regulation. 43 Hence,
even state laws that do not attempt to regulate naturalization, admittance, or
deportation directly-such as laws that impose special state registration
136. See Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 43.
137. See id. art. 36.
138. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1249-54.
139. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
140. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1250.
141. See Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
142. Although the Constitution does not expressly allocate authority over immigration solely to
the federal government, the Supreme Court has long interpreted the Constitution's express
grant of authority to Congress over naturalization and foreign affairs to imply that Congress
has plenary control over immigration. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
143. 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976). The Court upheld the state statute in this particular case because
Congress had not yet occupied the field, but Congress later passed a statute preempting the
kind of regulation at stake in De Canas. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2000) (preempting "any
State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions... upon those who employ, or recruit
or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens").
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requirements on aliens,' 44 that define immigration statuses differently from the
federal government scheme, 4s or that impose a state identification, verification,
and reporting scheme on illegal immigrants , 6-have been held to be
preempted by federal law. Accordingly, treaties that regulate aliens' rights in
the immigration and deportation contexts, such as their right to nonrefoulement,
are clearly within the field of regulation from which the states have been
excluded.
Further, the Supreme Court has specifically disempowered states from
making distinctions between the legal rights of citizens and aliens within the
state's borders by treating alienage as a suspect classification under its
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.'47 The federal government, of course, is
subject to no such limitation; 148 all of Title 8 of the U.S. Code, after all, is
devoted to enunciating law applicable solely to aliens. Thus the Court in
Graham v. Richardson struck down state welfare laws that limited access to
welfare benefits based on alienage, 149 while the Court in Mathews v. Diaz
upheld federal welfare laws that did the exact same thing.50 The Fourteenth
Amendment thereby effectively deprives the states of the ability to set special
rules for aliens, either positive or negative.
The Court's current understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment has
made many aliens' rights treaties, such as bilateral friendship treaties, simply
irrelevant in the modern era. Whereas treaties once were required to ensure
that states did not arbitrarily deprive aliens of the right to pursue a trade or
inherit land, today that work is done by the Equal Protection Clause.
Nevertheless, there are yet a few treaties that continue to ensure special rights
for aliens on subjects that would normally fall under the purview of the states.
Few of these treaties, however, register federalist concern.'"' Although the
144. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 59 (1941).
145. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 2005-0685 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/2o/o6); 948 So. 2d 1121.
146. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 769-71 (C.D. Cal.
1995).
147-. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984) ("As a general matter, a state law that
discriminates on the basis of alienage can be sustained only if it can withstand strict judicial
scrutiny."); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (finding that classifications
based on alienage "are inherently suspect and are therefore subject to strict judicial
scrutiny").
148. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 n.8 (1977) ("Congress, as an aspect of its broad power over
immigration and naturalization, enjoys rights to distinguish among aliens that are not
shared by the States.").
149. 403 U.S. at 374-76.
150. 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976).
151. See supra Section I.B.
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federal government cannot normally set limits on how states prosecute crimes
that occur within their borders, for example, individuals have enforced the
terms of extradition treaties during their criminal proceedings and won
dismissal of charges as a result.' -2 Similarly, Congress has no explicit power to
grant immunity to individuals under state law, yet the President and Senate by
treaty have immunized consular officials from local prosecution under article 43
of the Vienna Convention."' These uses of the treaty power do not strike
modem ears as implicating federalism at all, since federal authority over
immigrants is so well-established.
C. Congress's Authority To Regulate the Rights ofAliens
As for the impact of alien rights treaties on democracy, it is true that the
House of Representatives can make a stronger claim for its right to be involved
in creating laws that govern aliens. Most laws applicable solely to aliens,
including the terms of visas, requirements for obtaining permanent resident
status, naturalization rules, and laws concerning deportation, are elaborated
through regular statutory lawmaking, codified in Title 8 of the U.S. Code. No
one would argue, therefore, that the power to set rules that govern immigrants
is beyond the competency of both houses of Congress or is within the exclusive
purview of the President. Congress has even acted frequently to "execute" a
treaty's terms by passing statutes that incorporate its substance into domestic
law, as it did by (somewhat belatedly) implementing key portions of the U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees through the Refugee Act of
198o,'4 or by adding CAT's nonrefoulement provisions into the law governing
domestic deportations in 1998.' Today when aliens apply for relief from
deportation in the form of a withholding of removal under CAT, they have no
need to invoke the treaty directly, but rather would cite the regulations that
give effect to CAT issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security at Congress's
direction.,
6
If Congress frequently enacts the rights guaranteed to aliens by treaty into
statutory law, then one may question the need to have self-executing treaties
152. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 410-11 (1886) (allowing a federal criminal
defendant to raise the violation of an extradition treaty as a defense).
153. See, e.g., Risk v. Halvorsen, 936 F.2d 393 ( 9th Cir. 1991) (dismissing a civil suit against
Norwegian consular officials as a violation of the Vienna Convention).
154. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 1O2; see also Refugee Convention, supra note 124.
155. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat.
2681, 2681-822 to 2681-823.
156. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c) (2007).
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and individually enforceable rights in this area.'5 Congress, however, notably
has a much stronger record of implementing alien rights treaties, such as those
setting rules on domestic deportations, when they fall within the bounds of its
normal statutory authority under Article I, Section 8. Congress, for example,
has never implemented the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which
guarantees aliens the right to consular notification and guarantees consular
immunity to diplomatic officials.S8 Arguably, passing such implementing
legislation might seem to exceed Congress's statutory authority under Article I.
The Supreme Court long ago held, however, that Congress has the power to
enact any legislation to implement treaties, even if enacting the same legislation
in the absence of a treaty would exceed Congress's enumerated powers under
Article I.' 9 Regardless, as seen in the example of the Vienna Convention,
Congress seems to avoid doing so, perhaps in part because this constitutional
rule has been criticized in academic circles, even if it is still the firm law of the
courts.16 ° Courts should therefore not interpret the absence of implementing
legislation as evidence that holding the treaty self-executing would intrude on
the domain of Congress, particularly in those cases where Congress's authority
to enact such implementing legislation has been called into question.
Other considerations also weigh in favor of enforcing these treaties, despite
any arguable impact they may have on the prerogatives of the House of
Representatives. For one, Congress is thoroughly undemocratic when it comes
to representing the interests of aliens, since aliens have no right to vote.
Furthermore, the Americans who tend to suffer most from a failure to give
effect to an alien rights treaty-those citizens who travel abroad and seek to
take advantage of reciprocal protections from other states-form an ineffective
domestic lobbying group since they often do not know ex ante that these
benefits will be important to them. The President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, is just as well-suited as Congress to represent the interests of
157. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 2094 (arguing in favor of a rule of non-self-execution
when Congress possesses concurrent authority under Article i, Section 8, so as to
"maintain[] a strong distinction between the power to make treaties and the power to
legislate").
158. See Vienna Convention, supra note 75, arts. 36, 43. Today this treaty is universally recognized
as self-executing. See Comejo v. County of San Diego, No. 05-56202, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
22616, at *7 (9 th Cir. Sept. 24, 2007) ("There is no question that the Vienna Convention is
self-executing.").
159. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
16o. See Rosenkranz, supra note 9 (arguing that Missouri v. Holland was incorrectly decided, and
therefore that a treaty that regulates matters falling outside Congress's Article I, Section 8
authority cannot be implemented by statute and may only bind the states if it is self-
executing).
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aliens in the United States and of Americans who travel abroad. Judicial
enforcement of alien rights even in the absence of affirmative implementation
by both houses of Congress, in other words, provides a particular benefit to
this discrete and insular minority that otherwise might lack the political clout
to get treaty rights implemented into law.
D. The Judiciary's Role in Enforcing Alien Rights at Home
Although much of the academic debate over treaty rights centers on the
domestic enforcement of generally applicable human rights treaties like the
ICCPR, 61 courts are more occupied with treaties guaranteeing special rights to
aliens. Throughout the modern era, judges regularly treated alien rights
treaties, such as bilateral friendship treaties, as sources of individually
enforceable rights and allowed aliens to challenge official state action that
violated the treaty.162 Similarly, even without implementing language by
Congress, courts have consistently enforced the consular immunity provisions
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by tossing out civil suits and
criminal indictments against consular officials who were acting within the
scope of their duties. 6 No court questions whether enforcing these treaty
rights interferes with the prerogatives of the political branches or suggests that
violations of these treaty rights must be left solely to interstate protest and
diplomatic handling.
Indeed it is really only one treaty in particular -and one right within that
treaty- that particularly triggers anxieties about judicial interference in matters
supposedly best left to the political branches. Starting in the mid-199os, aliens
who were charged with crimes and were not notified of their right to consular
assistance have sought to claim this individual right directly from the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, a treaty that the State Department today
161. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8; Goldsmith, supra note 40.
162. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961) (allowing an alien to challenge a law that
limited the right to recover an inheritance as a violation of U.S.-Serbian friendship treaty);
Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1924) (allowing alien to challenge law
forbidding Japanese noncitizens from obtaining pawnbroking licenses as a violation of
bilateral friendship treaty).
163. See, e.g., Risk v. Halvorsen, 936 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1991) (dismissing a civil suit against
consular officials as a violation of the Vienna Convention); cf Gerritsen v. de la Madrid
Hurtado, 819 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987) (refusing to dismiss suit against consular officials on
the grounds that they were not acting within the scope of consular duties within the
meaning of article 43 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 45).
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concedes is self-executing. 64 Numerous courts of appeals and state supreme
courts have now heard claims from these aliens requesting various forms of
judicial relief, often either the exclusion of certain evidence from their criminal
trial or civil damages. Courts have generally rejected these claims, either
finding the requested relief improper 6, or simply refusing to recognize that the
treaty creates judicially enforceable rights. 66 Most judges who have rejected
claims under the Vienna Convention have clothed their decisions-if they
bothered to justify them at all -in the language of separation of powers167 But
given the courts' willingness to enforce very similar articles of the Vienna
Convention, 68 their refusal to enforce the consular notification provisions
seems to be motivated more by policy concerns -perhaps a sense that untold
thousands of incarcerated immigrants have had their rights violated and might
be able to file suits - than by constitutional principles.
As explained in Section II.C, the argument that courts ought to stay their
hand in enforcing treaties out of respect for the role of the political branches in
foreign affairs is not strong in the extraterritorial context and is even weaker
here. In the vast majority of cases, the courts would not be compelling executive
compliance with a treaty that guarantees rights to aliens, but state compliance.
Most violations of the right of consular notification under the Vienna
Convention, for example, are committed by state and local governments, who
164. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 14, Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (20o6) (No. 05-51) (noting that there is an "accepted
understanding that the Vienna Convention is self-executing").
165. Most courts have declined to reach the question of whether the treaty creates an individual
right to consular notification. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (declining to decide
whether individuals may assert a right to consular notification under the Vienna
Convention, but holding that proper redress does not include suppression of police
statements or dismissal of indictment); United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 165 (2d
Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 98o, 986-87 (iOth Cir. 2001)
(same); United States v. Lawal, 231 F.3 d 1045, 1048 (7 th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v.
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F. 3d 882, 885 (9 th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Li, 206
F.3d 56, 6o (1st Cir. 2000) (same).
166. See, e.g., Cornejo v. County of San Diego, No. 05-56202, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22616, at
*9 (9 th Cit. Sept. 24, 2007) (holding that aliens have no individual right to consular
notification under the Vienna Convention); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377,
394 (6th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F. 3d 192 (Sth Cir. 2001)
(same); State v. Sanchez-Llamas, io8 P.3d 573 (Or. 2005) (same); Kasi v. Commonwealth,
5o8 S.E.2d 57 (Va. 1998) (same). But see Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding
that an alien can seek civil damages for violation of the right to consular notification).
167. See cases collected supra notes 66-71.
168. See, e.g., Halvorsen, 936 F.2d 393; see also Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2696 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]his Court has routinely permitted individuals to enforce treaty provisions
similar to Article 36 in domestic judicial proceedings.").
117:68o 20o8
ENFORCING THE TREATY RIGHTS OF ALIENS
are no better equipped than the judiciary to decide when treaty commitments
"ought" to be respected or broken. 6' The very point of the Supremacy Clause
is to enlist the judiciary in protecting the federal government from
embarrassment when states refuse to obey the nation's treaty commitments.
The judicial enforcement of self-executing treaties, therefore, does not hamper
the political branches' conduct of foreign affairs, but abets it.
IV. CREATING A FRAMEWORK FOR ENFORCING TREATY RIGHTS
In the last three decades, the United States has shown great enthusiasm for
the project of elaborating international human rights through treaty law, while
also developing a tableau of legal and political tactics that have ensured that
such treaties would not truly become the "Law of the Land." This shows that
while most Americans believe that human rights are an important and
worthwhile subject for international codification, few have fully embraced the
idea that they should be indifferent to having their domestic rights regulated
by statute, the Constitution, or treaty. Self-governance by the terms of the
Constitution or by statutes passed by both houses of Congress, subject to the
limitations of the Tenth Amendment and with the participation of the House
of Representatives, is simply too deeply ingrained as a constitutional norm.
Treaties that fail to comport with these domestic understandings of democracy,
sovereignty, and federalism accordingly tend to meet strong resistance.
These strong political headwinds have produced unfortunate results. The
Senate now broadly declares most treaties to be non-self-executing, regardless
of the context and effect of the treaty. ' This, in turn, seems to have
encouraged the judiciary to be hostile to enforcing treaty law across the board,
even where the Senate has not attached a non-self-executing declaration, and
even where the constitutional concerns that might animate an argument
against enforcement are not present.17 1 As a result, it is unlikely that an
American citizen will ever be able to claim a right under a treaty that the Senate
169. See supra notes 165-166 (listing cases involving state and local violations of an alien's right to
consular notification under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations).
170. See Henkin, supra note 21, at 347 (noting that most human rights treaties ratified during the
198os and 199os contained non-self-executing declarations and that attaching such
declarations "now threatens to become the common practice").
171. See Quigley, supra note 19, at 554 (noting that the "approach by the courts in recent decades"
of finding treaties non-self-executing "contrasts with that of our nineteenth-century
courts"); Vizquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 19 (noting the general modem trend that
courts have tended to confuse the doctrine of self-executing treaties, leading to an expansion
of non-self-execution).
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has declared to be non-self-executing, 72 and the courts' willingness to enforce
aliens' treaty rights at home is rapidly eroding. Aliens abroad, meanwhile, may
not be able to claim any rights at all. Clearly, aliens at home and abroad suffer
most severely when treaty rights are not judicially enforceable, since they likely
have no recourse to an overlapping legal regime, such as constitutional rights.
Americans can always ultimately use politics to fight for better rights for
themselves; the detainees in Guantanamo have no such luxury.
Preventing the Supremacy Clause from becoming a dead letter requires the
participation of all branches in crafting a new framework for determining when
and how to make treaty-based rights enforceable before the courts. Most
importantly, the Senate should alter its practice of flatly declaring generally
applicable human rights treaties to be non-self-executing and instead limit
non-self-executing declarations to the treaty's domestic application. This
would ensure that the constitutional values the President and senators claim to
be protecting-such as the allocation of powers between the states and the
federal government, the role of the Bill of Rights as the sole language for
elaborating our fundamental commitments, and the role of the House of
Representatives -remain unaffected by the treaty. At the same time, these
limited reservations would preserve the rule of law abroad by allowing courts
to apply treaties directly to the actions of the United States extraterritorially.
Similarly, the Senate should continue to eschew non-self-executing
declarations as to treaties that are designed to protect rights unique to aliens,
just as they have for most of the nation's history. If the Senate's practice more
consistently mapped onto the underlying constitutional concerns, this might
encourage courts to treat such treaties as self-executing law when the treaty
contains no express reservation to the contrary and few constitutional values
are implicated by the treaty.
The losses from the failure to adopt such a system are tremendous. As the
United States expands its de facto international empire through a raft of new
foreign entanglements and a network of military prisons throughout the world,
Americans must determine what law (if any) ought to apply when their
government exerts its considerable power on aliens abroad. The options at the
two ends of the extremes-no law at all, or applying the Constitution and
172. See, e.g., Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding the
ICCPR not self-executing); Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1381 (S.D. Ga.
2000) (same); Calderon v. Reno, 39 F. Supp. 2d 943, 956 (N.D. I1l. 1998) (holding the CAT
not self-executing); White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (holding
that neither the ICCPR nor the CAT was a self-executing treaty and noting that the Senate
"expressly declared" this to be so); Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279, 128o (Nev. 1998)
(holding the ICCPR not self-executing in part due to the "Senate's express reservation"
against it).
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statutes extraterritorially- are each politically and practically problematic.
Applying, say, the Fourth Amendment abroad would effectively put an end to
the government's extraterritorial espionage activities. Picking and choosing to
apply some constitutional rights and not others, however, seems similarly
fraught with difficulties. 173 Yet in light of widespread stories of human rights
abuses at Guantanamo and elsewhere, the American people seem ready to find
that some law governs their government's conduct abroad. The Supreme
Court's effort to avoid declaring the American military base on Guantanamo a
lawless locale-which it accomplished, for a short time, by grasping a
congressional statute that arguably incorporates the Geneva Conventions by
reference 74- reflects the depth of opposition to allowing the executive branch
free rein abroad when individual rights are at stake. The most obvious solution
to this rights conundrum is to give aliens the set of rights recognized around
the world as fundamental human rights. This solution is currently blocked,
however, by the Senate's practice of labeling all treaties unenforceable.
This is regrettable, since treaty rights often address modern human rights
dilemmas better than constitutional rights. 17' Take, for example, the problem
of establishing the right to humane treatment for alien detainees in U.S.
custody abroad. Even if such aliens could assert rights under the Eighth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the Eighth Amendment
only prohibits cruel and unusual punishments for those tried and convicted of a
crime. 76 Pretrial detainees receive no protection from abusive treatment unless
173. In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), for example, a plurality of the Supreme Court rejected
the idea that U.S. citizens abroad should only receive "fundamental" rights and instead
adopted essentially an all-or-nothing rule. Id. at 8-9 (plurality opinion) ("While it has been
suggested that only those constitutional rights which are 'fundamental' protect Americans
abroad, we can find no warrant, in logic or otherwise, for picking and choosing among the
remarkable collection of 'Thou shalt nots' which were explicitly fastened on all departments
and agencies of the Federal Government by the Constitution and its Amendments.").
174. Cf Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
175. Applying treaties abroad in lieu of the Constitution would not result in detainees abroad
getting more robust legal protections than detainees at home. Senate reservations to a
human rights treaty stating that its provisions should be interpreted in line with existing
constitutional rights would also apply abroad, ensuring that effectively the same legal
standards govern abroad as govern at home.
176. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) ("An examination of the history of the
Amendment and the decisions of this Court construing the proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment confirms that it was designed to protect those convicted of crimes.");
see also In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 480 (D.D.C. 2005)
(dismissing Guantanamo detainees' Eighth Amendment claims on the grounds that "[t]he
Eighth Amendment applies only after an individual is convicted of a crime.").
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they can claim rights under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause. 1'7 The
Fifth Amendment, however, contains an array of substantive and procedural
due process guarantees, not all of which would be equally appropriate to apply
to aliens abroad. Seen in this light, the Torture Convention's proscription of
"cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" is a better fit for the detainee
treatment dilemma. It is both broader than the Eighth Amendment, because it
protects both pretrial and postconviction detainees, but narrower than the Fifth
Amendment, since it does not come packaged with the Fifth Amendment's full
panoply of due process rights. It should not be surprising that human rights
treaties thus provide a narrower but firmer base on which to construct a regime
of rights for aliens under American control abroad, since these rights derive not
from a social contract among the citizenry regarding self-government, but from
the dignity inherent in every human being.
Similarly, treaties that guarantee rights to aliens qua aliens do not present
an affront to the values of democracy, federalism, and sovereignty, but do
provide a vulnerable minority with discrete protections otherwise unavailable
under American law. Many of these treaties are self-executing and have long
been treated as such by the courts; it is only in recent decades, in response to
the controversy over the Vienna Convention's consular notification provisions,
that courts have begun bucking this tradition. Although courts are cagey about
their reasoning, it seems at least plausible that their marked reluctance to
enforce alien treaty rights is a spillover effect from the political branches' recent
habit of declaring most treaties non-self-executing. Courts may be conflating
the political branches' critique of an expansive treaty power, which is
motivated by democracy, sovereignty, and federalism concerns, with a broad
criticism that enforcing treaty rights somehow interferes with the conduct of
foreign affairs. As has been shown, however, the political branches' concerns
are far more specific. They are also, importantly, subject to change. When
courts "constitutionalize" these concerns by folding them into separation-of-
powers case law, courts both overstate these concerns and make them
permanent. Instead, courts should conduct a more sensitive case-by-case
analysis of whether these constitutional values are jeopardized by enforcing the
asserted treaty right. Courts can then better capture the real concerns
motivating the political branches when they resist incorporating treaty law into
domestic law. Notably, few of these concerns are implicated by treaties that
guarantee rights specific to aliens, like the Vienna Convention.
177. See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 464 ("[T]he respondents'
contention that the Guantanamo detainees have no constitutional rights is rejected, and the
Court recognizes the detainees' rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.").
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Admittedly, proponents of treaty-based law may be reluctant to embrace
this more piecemeal approach to executing and enforcing treaty rights. It
would mean, in effect, surrendering in the short term the possibility of using
treaty law to alter fundamental domestic law for citizens, such as incorporating
CAT's ban on "cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" alongside this
country's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. At this point, however, there is no
practical possibility that any court will find that an international human rights
treaty provides a U.S. citizen with an individually enforceable right; no court
has ignored a non-self-executing declaration attached to a treaty, and none
seems likely to do so in the future. 178 Selective incorporation represents a third
way, and may even lead to a greater acceptance of treaty law over the long
term. As Judith Resnik has shown, states and localities have exhibited some
enthusiasm for adopting international law norms, thus incorporating them
into the corpus of United States law in piecemeal fashion. 7 9 This practice blurs
the boundaries between the "foreign" and the "domestic" and may over time
weaken opposition to treaty law on grounds of sovereignty.1o Greater
enforcement of treaty law abroad and aliens' treaty rights at home may keep
the doors of the American courthouse open to treaty law while eroding political
opposition to "foreign" law.
Treaty law has the potential to be an important and unique mechanism for
governing the conduct of the United States in a rapidly globalizing world.
Today, however, treaty law only provokes endless and wearying domestic
conflict over whether, for example, the CAT could be used to invalidate the
ever-popular United States death penalty. Presidents who care about human
rights could instead use treaty law to require that their successors provide the
most basic dignities to individuals subject to U.S. power abroad. It could also
be reinvigorated as a source of rights that protect uniquely vulnerable aliens
within the United States. Unlike statutory law, treaty law represents a more
sensitive mix of presidential control and enforceability in the foreign policy
context. Because Presidents retain much greater control over treaty law, they
may someday see the value in establishing a framework of extraterritorial law
based on treaties instead of statutes or the Constitution. Further, if Americans
were told that broadly based human rights treaties would apply directly only to
the government's actions abroad, it is highly likely that political opposition
would significantly diminish.
178. See cases collected supra note 172.
179. See Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism's Multiple Points of Ennry, 1iS YALE L.J. i564, 1626-52 (2006).
iso. See id. at 1576-79.
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Admittedly, at this point in time the political will for even this limited kind
of judicial enforcement of treaties appears to be absent. Congress has recently
moved not only to deprive aliens at Guantanamo of their right to habeas
corpus, but also of their ability to claim any rights under the Geneva
Conventions.'"' This move, however, is best understood as the last gasp of an
administration that never supported the substantive law in the first place.
Future administrations, however, may well see the value in committing their
successors to obey international legal norms and using courts to enforce those
norms. If courts support this system of Presidents binding Presidents, they will
ensure that Odysseus stays tied tight to the mast during periods of
international tension or terror. Instead of hiding behind the idea that any issue
that touches on foreign affairs must be the exclusive domain of the political
branches, judges should see treaty law as a politically sensitive and democracy-
affirming way to apply law to government actions at home or abroad in areas
where Congress is less likely to govern by statute. The treaty power was not
necessarily imagined to be the answer for the modern dilemmas of an
international quasi-imperialist power, but it may be able to provide one.
181. In the Military Commissions Act of 2oo6, Congress provided that "[n]o person may invoke
the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action
or proceeding to which the United States... is a party as a source of rights in any court of
the United States or its States or territories." Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5, 120 Stat. 2600, 2631
(2006).
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